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introduction
The criminal justice system is broken. Its policies and policing practices
ﬂood courtrooms in urban environments with too many cases to handle given
available resources. Many are cases involving indigent individuals of color accused of nonviolent offenses. Scholars like Sasha Natapoff, Jenny Roberts, and
Issa Kohler-Hausmann are bringing much needed attention to this serious issue, focusing primarily on misdemeanor adjudications.1
In a groundbreaking new book, Crook County: Racism and Injustice in America’s Largest Criminal Court, Professor Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve2 adds an important, novel dimension to this problem. She exposes the deeply ﬂawed operation of the criminal justice system by focusing on how felonies are processed
in Cook County, Illinois. Her disturbing ethnography of the Cook CountyChicago criminal courts, the largest uniﬁed criminal court system in the United
States,3 is based upon 104 in-depth interviews with judges, prosecutors, public
defenders, and private attorneys; her own experiences clerking for both the
Cook County District Attorney’s Office and the Cook County Public Defender’s
Office; and one thousand hours of felony courtroom observations conducted
by 130 court watchers.4 This mix of perspectives, all of which focus on the court
professionals “whose actions deﬁne the experience and appearance of justice,”5
provides a chilling account of how racialized justice is practiced in the Cook
County criminal justice system, despite the existence of due process protections
and a court record. By “turn[ing] the lens on those in power as they do the
marginalizing,”6 Van Cleve reveals how judges, defense lawyers, and prosecutors transform race-neutral due process protections into the tools of racial punishment.

1.

2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611,
639-53 (2014); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313 (2012); Jenny
Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Deﬁning Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts,
45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277 (2011).
Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve is an Assistant Professor at Temple University in the Department
of Criminal Justice with courtesy appointments in the Department of Sociology and the
Beasley School of Law. She is a recipient of the 2014-2015 Ford Foundation Fellowship Postdoctoral Award and was a Visiting Scholar at the American Bar Foundation.
NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT xii (2016).
Id. at xiii, 6-7, 9-10, 54.
Id. at xiii.
Id.
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An important theme of Van Cleve’s book is that the racism practiced in the
Cook County courts is not “more enigmatic than the overt racism of the past.”7
Rather, it is equally “pervasive, direct, and violent.”8 To substantiate this point,
she exposes deeply problematic and explicitly racist practices that courtroom
actors engage in, despite holding seemingly contradictory perspectives. This is
one of the more compelling aspects of her book, since it is unusual to encounter
such blatant racism on display in this ostensibly colorblind and post-racial era.
She explains how these actors “claim their behavior as ‘colorblind’ through
coded language, mimic fairness through due process procedures, and rationalize abuse based on morality—all while achieving the experience of segregation
and de facto racism.”9
In this Review, I complicate the theory of racism underlying Van Cleve’s
ethnography. Although she never states this explicitly, her theory rests on the
assumption that racial bias is visible and conscious, even if expressed in ways
that mask its presence. This is demonstrated not only by the examples she uses,
but also by the book’s conclusion, which encourages readers to go to court to
observe the racist practices she describes and thus shame courtroom actors into
changing them.
However, I argue that the problem of racial bias is not so limited. Rather,
research from the past several decades reveals that implicit racial biases can inﬂuence the behaviors and judgments of even the most consciously egalitarian
individuals in ways of which they are unaware and thus unable to control. Additionally, the effects of implicit biases may not be open and obvious. Importantly, then, the absence of discernible racism does not signal the absence of
racial bias. Furthermore, since it is not possible to detect the inﬂuence of implicit biases on decision making simply through observations and interviews, it
is difficult to ferret out and even more difficult to address. Yet, the absence of
overtly racist practices does not make the problem of racial bias any less concerning.
Despite the fact that implicit biases operate in the shadows, I argue that
there is strong reason to suspect that they will inﬂuence the judgments of
courtroom actors in Cook County, even after blatantly racist practices disappear. This is because criminal courthouses in jurisdictions across the country,
including those in Cook County, are bearing the brunt of “tough on crime” policies and policing practices that disproportionately target enforcement of nonviolent and quality of life offenses in indigent, urban, and minority communi7.
8.
9.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 186.
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ties. These policies and practices burden the system with more cases than it has
the capacity to handle, resulting in what I refer to as systemic triage.
Triage denotes the process of determining how to allocate scarce resources.
In the criminal justice context, scholars typically use the term triage to describe
how public defenders attempt to distribute zealous advocacy amongst their clients because crushing caseloads limit their ability to zealously represent them
all.10 In this Review, I build upon my prior work examining public defender
triage11 and use the phrase systemic triage to highlight that all criminal justice
system players are impacted by such expansive criminal justice policies and policing practices—not only public defenders, but also the entire cadre of courtroom players, including prosecutors and judges.
I argue that under conditions of systemic triage, implicit racial biases are
likely to thrive. First, these criminal justice policies and policing practices will
strengthen the already ubiquitous association between subordinated groups
and crime by ﬁlling courtrooms with overwhelming numbers of people of color. Second, implicit biases ﬂourish in situations where individuals make decisions quickly and on the basis of limited information, exactly the circumstances
that exist under systemic triage. In sum, the problem of racial bias will likely
persist under conditions of systemic triage, even when it is not accompanied by
patently racist behaviors. This problem is even more pernicious because its
subtle nature makes it more challenging to expose and correct.
This Review proceeds in three parts. Part I summarizes and analyzes Van
Cleve’s ethnographic evidence and conclusions. Importantly, because her account is primarily qualitative, I cannot quantify the frequency with which the
problematic practices she identiﬁes occur nor determine how representative her
examples are. Part II argues that racism in the criminal justice system is more
problematic and pernicious than even Van Cleve’s account suggests. Relying on
social science evidence demonstrating the existence of implicit racial biases, I
argue that these biases can inﬂuence the discretionary decisions, perceptions,
10.

11.

Other discussions of triage in the criminal justice system tend to focus on public defender
triage. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from
Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801 (2004) (arguing that trial judges face the task of
rationing public defense services); Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 475 (2007) (describing “the rise in total number of cases
requiring appointment of counsel and the inadequacy of indigent defense budgets” (footnote omitted)); John B. Mitchell, Redeﬁning the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1215,
1225 (1994) (“[T]his Article suggests the [public] defender’s work is better described by the
medical/disaster theory of allocation in chaos—triage.”); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba
Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626 (2013) (arguing that
public defender triage presents a way for implicit racial bias to affect legal outcomes).
Richardson & Goff, supra note 10.
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and practices of even the most well-meaning individuals in ways that are not
readily observable. We should be especially concerned about implicit bias in
courtrooms experiencing systemic triage. Finally, Part III offers some solutions
to reduce the racialized effects of systemic triage.
i. racism in practice
Van Cleve’s haunting ethnography argues that the existence of “myriad due
process protections, legal safeguards, and a courtroom record supposedly holding judges and lawyers accountable”12 does little to prevent racism from manifesting in the criminal courtrooms of Cook County. Rather, her work reveals
how these courts are “transformed from central sites of due process into central
sites of racialized punishment.”13 This punishment takes multiple forms, including treating people of color as criminals even when they are members of
the public appearing in court as jurors, witnesses, or researchers;14 ridiculing
defendants with stereotypically black-sounding names;15 mocking the speech
patterns of black defendants by employing a bastardized version of Ebonics;16
using lynching language during plea negotiations;17 and subjecting people of
color to degrading and humiliating treatment.18 Van Cleve argues that courtroom actors also routinely punish defendants of color for attempting to exercise their due process rights.
Evidence from her ethnography reveals that judges, prosecutors, defense
lawyers, and sheriff ’s deputies engaged in these racialized practices. Even more
disturbingly, bad racial actors were not the only ones to treat people of color
more harshly.19 Van Cleve’s ethnography would be slightly less chilling if this
were the case because then one could take some comfort knowing that the
problems would disappear once all the bad apples were removed from the system. However, Van Cleve’s observations foreclose this simplistic account. Rather, she includes examples of even well-meaning judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers participating in and sustaining this system of racial punishment.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

VAN CLEVE, supra note 3, at xi.
Id. at 11.
See generally id. ch. 1 (describing the various forms of racialized punishment in Cook County).
Id. at 60-61.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 108.
See, e.g., id. at 59-65.
Id. at 6.
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The obvious question is how can actors who “subscribe to the principles of
due process, . . . learn ethical standards in law school[,] . . . speak in sympathetic ways about justice, fairness, colorblindness, and even identify bias in the
system,” engage in and rationalize their racialized practices?20 As I discuss in
Section I.A, Van Cleve argues that racism in the courts is accomplished through
a process of acculturation that begins at the courthouse doors with sheriff ’s
deputies enforcing racial boundaries. In Section I.B, I present Van Cleve’s assessment of how this racialized culture is maintained through the aggressive
policing and harsh treatment of anyone, including courtroom actors, who fails
to observe its practices.21 I also describe Van Cleve’s explanation for how judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys rationalize their racist behaviors by divorcing their perspectives from their practices or “duties” within the system. It
is in this way, she argues, that they deﬂect blame, assuage their guilt, and abdicate responsibility for their role in maintaining the system of racialized punishment. Finally, Section I.C explores some limitations of her powerful and disturbing account.
A. Policing Racial Boundaries
Van Cleve suggests that the “double system of justice”22 that exists in Cook
County begins as defendants, family members, jurors, and witnesses arrive at
the courthouse during the morning “rush hour.” She argues that armed sheriff ’s deputies, who are the ﬁrst institutional players the public encounters,
begin the process of teaching people of color that they are second-class citizens
within this space.23 To support this point, she shares accounts of court watchers who observed deputies single out people of color for racial mockery and
disrespect, making white court watchers acutely aware of their white privilege.24 She explains that some white court watchers, no matter how they were
dressed, reported being asked why they were there and whether they were lawyers or students, while some black court watchers “were mistaken for defendants and treated like criminals.”25
She also provides anecdotes of sheriff ’s deputies continuing to police racial
boundaries in the courtrooms by subjecting people of color to hostile and dis20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 133.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 22-28.
Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 25, 41-42.
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respectful treatment for actions as simple—and reasonable—as daring to ask
questions. When Van Cleve was a clerk in the prosecutor’s office, she observed
an incident that occurred when an elderly black woman attempted to ascertain
where her son’s case would be heard. The deputy “tore the woman up with insults” and ﬁnally stated to a prosecutor walking into the courtroom, “Tell her:
‘Your son is executed.’”26 In contrast, Van Cleve also observed the different
treatment of an older, gray-haired white woman—wearing a diamond wedding
ring and sporting “perfectly coiffed” hair and “manicured and pristine” nails—
who crossed the barrier separating the gallery from the courtroom to talk to the
court clerk. This woman “was able to ﬁnish her question, was answered respectfully, and then the sheriff kindly told her to sit down—acting more like an
usher than the abuser who had been barking at the public all afternoon.”27
These are just a few of the disturbing examples of sheriff ’s deputies demeaning
people of color while treating the few privileged whites who appeared in the
courthouse differently.
Van Cleve’s book does not share a single story in which courtroom actors
chastised deputies for the hostility and aggressiveness they heaped on people of
color. Instead, she argues that courtroom actors were socialized within the
courthouse culture to avoid commenting on racial abuse and racial divides.28
This is discussed next.
B. Culture and the Race-Blind Code
Sheriff ’s deputies were not the only courtroom actors to engage in racist
behaviors. Van Cleve shares anecdotes of judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers helping to create and sustain a system of racial punishment. Based on her
ethnographic evidence, she explains that courtroom professionals learn to code
race out of the picture by conﬂating criminality, morality, and race. This is done
primarily by labeling certain defendants as “mopes,” a construct that implies
immorality.29 The term is used by courtroom actors to refer to “someone who is
uneducated, incompetent, degenerate, and lazy.”30 According to her, mope is a
synonym for “nigger.”31

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 32-35.
Id. at 57-61.
Id. at 61.
Id.
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Defendants who were labeled mopes were typically charged with nonviolent offenses, such as possession of drugs and shoplifting, that “imply social
dysfunction rather than criminal risk.”32 Because these defendants were overwhelmingly black and brown, “the moral rubric applied to defendants by
courtroom professionals” was racially inscribed.33 As such, the “‘immorality’ of
defendants . . . is both a criminal distinction and a racial one . . . .”34 Van Cleve
argues that by using this colorblind logic, courtroom professionals convinced
themselves that the “disdain” they showed to people of color was “not based
upon the color of their skin but upon the moral violations they embody.”35 She
concludes that this “race-blind” code “allow[ed] racism to exist in the courthouse space without professionals being ‘racists.’”36
Defendants labeled as mopes received “due process for the undeserving.”37
This entailed “(1) the streamlining of scripted due process requirements, (2)
the curtailing of due process through informal sanctions that are often not part
of the court record, and (3) the absolute exclusion of mopes from participation
in the legal process—even in cursory ways mandated by law.”38 Van Cleve
shares stories of courtroom actors punishing those labeled as mopes for attempting to exercise their due process rights. In one disturbing example, Van
Cleve overheard a sheriff ’s deputy bragging to prosecutors about wrapping an
electrical cord around a defendant’s seat, plugging it into the wall to feign an
electric chair, and saying, “OK, you’re all plugged in and ready to go.”39 This
was done simply because the defendant had asked for a jury trial.40 Prosecutors
“laughed, and never questioned the legal ethics of such a practical joke.”41
White defendants, she argues, were generally not subjected to the same treatment,42 unless they “perform[ed] underclass whiteness” through their speech
patterns or demeanor.43

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 115.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 68-69.
Id. at 73.
Id.
Id. at 63.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 65-69.
Id. at 68.
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One of the most important aspects of Van Cleve’s ethnography is her explanation for how racism becomes entrenched in institutional culture such that it
persists regardless of “the racial identity and political leaning of any one person
at the helm.”44 For instance, some prosecutors expressed serious misgivings
about the way the system treated criminal defendants, and some of them also
viewed drug laws as draconian.45 Ironically, one prosecutor even critiqued the
“factory mill” practices of the system, which was only concerned with disposing of cases as quickly as possible.46 Yet, based on their statements during interviews, Van Cleve concludes that prosecutors learned to rationalize their racialized behaviors by separating their perspectives from their practices.47 They
viewed their practice of law as a “duty” that did not necessarily reﬂect their actual beliefs.48 Additionally, she found that prosecutors justiﬁed the curtailment
of due process rights by convincing themselves that spending time on cases involving mopes “literally obstructs ‘real justice’”49 by taking resources away
from the important cases involving serious crimes with actual victims.50 Their
incentive was to resolve their cases as quickly as possible because due process
for mopes, in the words of one prosecutor, was “a waste.”51
Similarly, defense lawyers were sympathetic to “the plight of defendants,”
“provide[d] critiques about substantive justice and the abuse of defendants by
prosecutors and judges,”52 and commented on the “obvious racial disparities
and divisions in the ways prosecutors and judges treated their indigent clients.”53 Yet, they too engaged in racialized practices. This occurred because defense lawyers learned that “[t]here were dire consequences for ﬁghting too
hard, pursuing ‘too many’ motions and trials, or pushing due process necessities beyond the absolute minimum.”54 Defense attorneys who engaged in vigorous and zealous advocacy often “were labeled ‘clueless,’ ‘difficult,’ ‘incompe-

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 133.
Id. at 13-16, 138.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 135, 137.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 71-73.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 97. Private attorney responses were more mixed, with about half expressing that bias
existed and the other half expressing that it did not. Id. at 97-98.
Id. at 83.
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tent,’ or worse: ‘mopes,’”55 and were humiliated and punished in ways that
were not reﬂected in the court record.56 For example, one attorney was locked
up with her client.57 Additionally, the clients of defense attorneys who engaged
in zealous advocacy were sometimes punished with harsher treatment.58
As a result of this socialization, one defense lawyer explained that he had to
carefully weigh how much capital he expended on a client because capital was
“ﬁnite and scarce.”59 He had to “determine whether a defendant [wa]s worth
the ﬁght”60 by separating those who were “native” to the system from the “tiny
subset of outliers” who deserved zealous advocacy.61 He deﬂected personal responsibility for the problematic choices he made, saying that “these are the
sorts of decisions you ﬁnd yourself having to make as a practical matter because
that’s the system that exists and [it’s] bigger than you.”62
In sum, Van Cleve’s book explains how criminal justice system professionals dispense, legitimize, and defend racialized justice. She argues, “Colorblind
racism is more than just a ‘doing’ of rhetoric; it is a type of complicated habitus
that informs institutional practices and cultural memberships, and even aids in
the organizational efficiency of the criminal courts . . . . [This is] how professionals . . . ‘do racism’ while ‘doing justice.’”63 Her own efforts to ﬁt into the
system and maintain her privileged access within it powerfully underscores the
importance of entrenched institutional culture to sustaining racial disadvantage.64 She describes her time embedded in the Cook County criminal justice system as “an indoctrination: the prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys took me under their wings. It was through this process that I learned the
rules of the racialized court system—rules that included both how to process
cases efficiently and the proper moral and professional justiﬁcations for such
practices.”65

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id. at 83, 103.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 160-61.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 53.
See, e.g., id. at 8, 9, 61.
Id. at 8.
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C. Limitations
Van Cleve’s account of how racism is practiced in the era of colorblindness
is important and compelling. However, it is limited by a number of features
typical of ethnographies. First, her observations are not necessarily generalizable to jurisdictions beyond Cook County.66 Second, the absence of quantitative
evidence makes it difficult to determine how frequent, representative, and pervasive the overtly racialized practices she exposes are.67 Including some explanation of how she coded her data and how she determined which stories to include and exclude, as well as sharing the complexity of her evidence by
discussing cases that did not ﬁt neatly into her theory, could have helped address some of these problems and allowed readers to more readily evaluate her
claims.
However, despite these limitations, there are reasons to believe that her
qualitative accounts are representative of the culture of the Cook County criminal courts. Her ethnographic evidence is the result of nine months of observations collected over the course of seven years (1997-2004);68 interviews she
conducted during the same period; 104 interviews conducted by others in
2006;69 and data collected by 130 court watchers from 2008-09.70 Thus, her data “incorporate[] multiple vantage points on the same site”71 and span over
twelve years. Furthermore, the observations remain consistent over this period
of time. All of this provides support for the pervasiveness of the practices she
recounts and lends some external reliability to her ﬁndings.72 Additionally, the

66.

67.

68.
69.
70.

71.
72.

John D. Brewer, The Ethnographic Critique of Ethnography: Sectarianism in the FUC, 28 SOC.
231, 233 (1994) (“Ethnography falls short because ﬁndings cannot be generalised; and when
ethnographers make claims about empirical generalisation they often fail to establish that
the setting is typical of the larger population to which the data are thought to be relevant.”).
In one instance, she does provide some quantitative data to support her powerful qualitative
account. For instance, when discussing whether defense lawyers believed that defendants
were treated fairly regardless of race or class, she included two tables providing the percentage of attorneys who answered the question in the affirmative, in the negative, or failed to
answer the question at all. VAN CLEVE, supra note 3, at 97. However, no similar empirical evidence was provided for any of her other claims.
Id.
Id. at 197.
Id. She explains that she used this multifaceted approach because in an era where people
avoid expressing negative racial attitudes, it is difficult to measure the inﬂuence of race using
a single method. Id. at 195-96.
Id. at 196.
See Margaret D. LeCompte & Judith Preissle Goetz, Problems of Reliability and Validity in
Ethnographic Research, 52 REV. EDUC. RES. 31, 32 (1982) (“External reliability addresses the
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lack of quantitative evidence is not a reason to dismiss her compelling conclusions. As one of the great ethnographers, Howard Becker, once observed in a
classic article, qualitative methods “do not lend themselves to . . . ready summary”73 and “frequently consist of many different kinds of observations which
cannot be simply categorized and counted without losing some of their value as
evidence.”74
Overall, the importance of Van Cleve’s ethnography is its exposure of how
some courtroom professionals in Cook County practice and rationalize racism
in the era of colorblindness. She explains how racism thrives despite constitutional safeguards and courtroom actors who are well versed in ethics and who
often hold perspectives that are consistent with notions of fairness, equality,
and justice.75 Van Cleve’s account of racism in the Cook County criminal courts
is concerning and important to expose even if it is difficult to determine how
pervasive these overtly racialized practices are.
In Part II, my goal is to supplement Van Cleve’s account of how racial bias
operates. Van Cleve concludes that the practice of racism in Cook County is virtually indistinguishable from the racist practices of the Jim Crow era.76 In support of this theory, she only shares examples of courtroom actors engaging in
overtly problematic racialized practices in cases involving individuals labeled as
mopes.77 By restricting her examples, her account leaves the impression that
the problem of racism in Cook County is limited to that which is overt, explicit,
and conscious. However, in Part II, I argue that racism in the criminal justice
system is even more problematic. Relying on social science evidence demonstrating the existence of implicit racial biases, I contend that explicitly racist
practices are not the only form of racism about which we should be concerned.

73.
74.

75.
76.
77.

issue of whether independent researchers would discover the same phenomena or generate
the same constructs in the same or similar settings.”).
Howard S. Becker, Problems of Inference and Proof in Participant Observation, 23 AM. SOC. REV.
652, 659-60 (1958).
Id.; see also ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 7-9 (1968) (explaining that the author did not gather statistical evidence because a good way to learn about any social world is to obtain ethnographic detail instead).
See VAN CLEVE, supra note 3, at 11-13.
See id. at 186.
The only instance she offers of normative professionalism involved a defense lawyer who
was not part of any particular courtroom workgroup. According to Van Cleve, this lawyer’s
outsider status protected her from the culture of the Cook County courts. Id. at 77-78. Van
Cleve does not explain why she provides no accounts of courtroom actors engaging in positive interactions with those labeled mopes. The reader is thus left wondering whether these
examples existed but she chose not to include them, or whether she and others simply did
not observe professional conduct in cases involving mopes.
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Rather, implicit racial bias can also inﬂuence the discretionary decisions, perceptions, and practices of even the most well-meaning individuals in ways that
are not readily observable. Thus, my theory of racism is broader than one that
focuses solely on the overt racism Van Cleve exposes. While her account of explicitly racist conduct is deeply troubling, I argue that the problem of implicit
racism is even more pernicious.
ii. systemic triage and its racialized consequences
Judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers in many criminal courtrooms
across the country are laboring under the weight of far too many cases to give
each one individualized treatment. This has systemic consequences as these
professionals struggle to quickly sort defendants into those who are deserving
of time and attention and those who are not, a process I describe as systemic
triage. As I will explain, racialized justice is a foreseeable consequence of systemic triage because of the inﬂuence of implicit, i.e. unconscious, racial biases
on behaviors, perceptions, and judgments. Section II.A summarizes the wellestablished social science research on implicit racial biases. Section II.B sets
forth my theory of systemic triage. Finally, Section II.C argues that under conditions of systemic triage, even well-meaning, consciously egalitarian actors
will likely engage in practices that sustain signiﬁcant and problematic racial
disparities.
A. Implicit Racial Bias
Research demonstrates that many of our decisions result from mental processes that occur without our conscious awareness, intent, and control.78 These
processes help us to cope with all the information that confronts us by making
quick, automatic, and unconscious associations in response to a stimulus.79 For
instance, we might automatically and unconsciously associate “nurse” with

78.

See John A. Bargh, The Four Horsemen of Automaticity: Awareness, Intention, Efficiency, and
Control in Social Cognition, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION 1 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. &
Thomas K. Srull eds., Psychology Press 2014) (1994).
79. Id. at 31 (stating that automatic processes “enable[] a reduction of the massive amount of
stimulation and information bombarding one at any given moment into a more manageable
subset of important objects, events, and appraisals”); Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery,
Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 483,
485 (2004) (“[T]he view of stereotypes as largely unconscious is consistent with social cognition research on the cognitive heuristics or shortcuts that perceivers must employ to manage the vast amount of social information with which they must deal.” (citation omitted)).
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“compassion” and “hospital.” These unconscious associations can inﬂuence our
perceptions, judgments, and behaviors without our conscious intent.
Implicit racial biases refer to the unconscious stereotypes and attitudes that
we associate with racial groups.80 These biases are pervasive and can inﬂuence
real world behaviors. For instance, a meta-analysis of 122 implicit bias studies
found evidence that implicit racial biases predict racial disparities in employment and healthcare.81
There is copious evidence that individuals of all races have implicit racial
biases linking blacks with criminality82 and whites with innocence. In a recent
article, Professors Robert Smith, Justin Levinson, and Zoë Robinson coined the
phrase “implicit white favoritism” to distinguish it from unconsciously negative racial attitudes and beliefs toward people of color.83 They deﬁne implicit
white favoritism as “the automatic association of positive stereotypes and attitudes with members of a favored group, leading to preferential treatment for
persons of that group.”84 Their analysis of existing studies reveals that white
men are unconsciously “disassociated with violence” and associated with positive, law-abiding behavior.85 Implicit racial biases are activated by cues present
in the environment such as skin color.86 Once activated, they can inﬂuence the

80.

81.
82.

83.
84.
85.
86.

The scholarship on implicit racial bias is vast. For a summary of the literature on implicit
racial bias, particularly as it relates to the criminal justice system, see Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012); and L. Song Richardson, Arrest
Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035 (2011).
Anthony G. Greenwald et al. , Statistically Small Effects of the Implicit Association Test Can
Have Societally Large Effects, 108 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 553, 558 (2015).
See, e.g., Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 876 (2004) (“The stereotype of Black Americans as violent and criminal has been documented by social psychologists for almost 60 years.” (citations omitted)); Graham & Lowery, supra note 79, at 485 (describing the “pernicious belief”
that African American youth are “violent, aggressive, dangerous, and possess adult-like
criminal intent”); Sophie Trawalter et al., Attending to Threat: Race-Based Patterns of Selective
Attention, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1322, 1322 (2008) (“There is overwhelming evidence that young Black men are stereotyped as violent, criminal, and dangerous.”).
See Robert J. Smith, Justin D. Levinson & Zoë Robinson, Implicit White Favoritism in the
Criminal Justice System, 66 ALA. L. REV. 871, 873 (2015).
Id. at 874-75 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 898 (emphasis added).
John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 241-42 (1996). Bargh
writes, “To the extent that an individual repeatedly has the same reaction to a social stimulus
event, the representation of that response should come eventually to be activated automatically on the mere occurrence of that event.” Id. at 231.
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behaviors and judgments of even the most egalitarian individuals in ways that
sustain problematic and unwarranted racial disparities.87
The inﬂuence of implicit biases on behaviors and judgments is not inevitable, however. Rather, certain environments are more conducive to their operation than others. Implicit biases ﬂourish in situations where information and
time are limited, decision makers are mentally drained and distracted, and decision making is highly discretionary.88 As I will discuss next, these conditions
exist under systemic triage.
B. Systemic Triage
Under an ideal model of criminal justice, courtroom professionals would
have sufficient resources to give time and attention to every case. However, today’s criminal justice system operates very differently. In large urban environments like Cook County, public defenders, prosecutors, and judges are inundated with far more cases involving nonviolent offenses than they are equipped
to handle. This makes it difficult to give each individual accused of misconduct
the care and consideration he or she deserves and is constitutionally entitled to
receive.89 For instance, public defenders in Rhode Island each handle more
than 1,700 cases per year, on average. The equivalent ﬁgures for individual
public defenders in Dallas and Arizona are 1,200 and 1,000 respectively.90 A re-

87.

See generally Greenwald et al., supra note 81, at 553 (describing how small, implicit biases can
have a societally signiﬁcant impact either by inﬂuencing many people in small ways or by
repeatedly affecting individuals); Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the
Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 17 (2009) (describing implicit racial bias studies). For a summary of critiques of
the implicit association test and responses to those critiques, see Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
“Continually Reminded of Their Inferior Position”: Social Dominance, Implicit Bias, Criminality,
and Race, 46 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 23, 41-45 (2014).
88. See infra Section II.C.
89. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1043, 1043 (2013) (noting the pressure to treat people as groups rather than as individuals,
which “is in deep tension with core precepts of criminal law, most fundamentally the idea
that criminal guilt is an individuated concept reﬂecting the defendant’s personal culpability”); Natapoff, supra note 1, at 1317-18; Lisa C. Wood et al., Meet-and-Plead: The Inevitable
Consequence of Crushing Defender Workloads, 42 LITIG. 20, 26 (2016) (noting that “the problem of excessive workloads is systemic” and that “[f]or years, tough-on-crime policies,
mandatory minimum sentences, collateral consequences, and broken-windows policing
pushed workloads ever higher”); see also Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 1, at 639 (describing
the large increase in the number of misdemeanor arrests in New York City from 1980 to
2011).
90. Wood et al., supra note 89, at 20, 22.
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cent article reports that “in upstate New York, one attorney represented over
2,200 clients; and in Illinois, a public defender handled 4,000 cases during the
course of a year.”91 These excessive caseloads impact defense lawyers, prosecutors, and judges alike,92 creating pressure on each of these courtroom actors to
engage in triage—the process of allocating scarce resources.
Typically, analysis of triage within the criminal justice system is focused on
public defender offices. Scholars have discussed how public defenders attempt
to distribute zealous advocacy amongst their clients since crushing caseloads
prevent them from providing it fully to all clients.93 As Phillip Atiba Goff and I
previously observed,
[T]he provision of indigent defense is often likened to medical triage.
Similar to hospital emergency rooms, [public defender] offices face
demands that far outpace their resources. In order to save time to defend the cases that they ﬁnd deserving, attorneys may plead out other
cases quickly or go to trial unprepared. This reality means that for most
[public defenders], the question is not “how do I engage in zealous and
effective advocacy,” but rather, “given that all my clients deserve aggressive advocacy, how do I choose among them?”94
Despite this robust discussion of public defender triage, however, little attention has been paid to the fact that judges and prosecutors also face intense
pressure to quickly determine which cases can be resolved with little time and
effort and which cases require or deserve the individualized attention associated
with due process. I refer to this situation of pressurized decision making by all
courtroom actors as systemic triage.
Systemic triage primarily results from criminal justice system policies and
policing practices such as the War on Drugs and broken windows policing95

91.
92.
93.

94.
95.

Id. at 20.
Id. at 21 (citing Honorable Sean C. Gallagher, A Judge’s Comments, 42 LITIG. 21 (2016)).
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 10; Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169, 1180-81 (2003); Mitchell, supra note 10, at 1224-25;
Richardson & Goff, supra note 10; see also Hashimoto, supra note 10, at 475 (“Lawyers carrying caseloads that far exceed national standards cannot adequately consult with their clients
or provide sufficient investigation.”).
Richardson & Goff, supra note 10, at 2632.
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 184 (2010) (arguing that “the War on Drugs is the engine of mass incarceration”); Ojmarrh Mitchell & Michael S. Caudy, Examining Racial Disparities in Drug Arrests,
32 JUST. Q. 288, 309 (2015) (ﬁnding that “the policies pursued under the War on Drugs disproportionately held African-Americans accountable for their transgressions”); see also
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that overwhelm courtroom professionals with more cases involving nonviolent
offenders than they have the capacity to handle. This creates pressure on these
actors to develop shortcuts for determining who deserves due process and who
does not. For instance, under conditions of systemic triage, prosecutors will
not have time, in every case, to interview victims and witnesses, and to make
careful and considered judgments about how to exercise their enormous discretion according to their ethical mandate as ministers of justice.96 Similarly, rather than providing effective and zealous advocacy to each of their clients by
conducting investigations,97 communicating and developing relationships with
clients,98 ﬁling motions,99 researching the law, preparing for trials, negotiating
pleas, and otherwise engaging in vigorous advocacy,100 defense lawyers instead
will ﬁnd ways to quickly determine when these time-consuming activities are
necessary. Finally, judges will be constrained in their ability to carefully consid-

96.
97.

98.
99.
100.

Katherine Beckett et al., Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrests, and the Question of Race: Lessons
from Seattle, 52 SOC. PROBS. 419 (2005) (noting the huge impact of the War on Drugs on
blacks); M. Chris Fabricant, War Crimes and Misdemeanors: Understanding “Zero-Tolerance”
Policing As a Form of Collective Punishment and Human Rights Violation, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 373,
393-95 (2011) (recounting the War on Drugs’ effect on blacks living in New York); K. Babe
Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance
Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 276-80 (2009) (critiquing broken windows
policing); Natapoff, supra note 89, 1063-66 (noting that police focus arrests on young men
of color); Al Baker, New York Minorities More Likely To Be Frisked, N.Y. TIMES (May
13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/nyregion/13frisk.html [http://perma.cc
/79DV-GPVM]; Ray Rivera et al., A Few Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police Stops, N.Y. TIMES (July
11, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/nyregion/12frisk.html [http://perma.cc
/NKK6-6QZZ]. Some scholars, such as Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, conclude that broken-windows policing “is not about disorderly places, nor about improving the quality of
life, but about policing poor people in poor places.” Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street
Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
457, 457 (2000). See generally George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The
Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), http://www.theatlantic.com
/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/ [http://perma.cc/YBP7-VJSS] (discussing broken windows policing).
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION,
ABA § 4-4.1 (4th ed. 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice
/standards/DefenseFunctionFourthEdition.html [http://perma.cc/9F26-DG3X].
Id. §§ 4-3.1, 4-3.3, 4-3.9, 4-5.1.
Id. §§ 4-5.2, 4-7.11, 4-8.1.
Id. § 4-4.6 (discussing counsel’s obligation to research the law); id. §§ 4-6.1 to -6.3 (discussing counsel’s obligation to negotiate). These ethical obligations apply regardless of the lawyer’s workload, see id. § 4-4.1(a) (“Defense counsel has a duty to investigate in all cases, and
to determine whether there is a sufficient factual basis for criminal charges.”), and whether
or not defendants want to plead guilty, id. §§ 4-4.1(b), 4-6.1(b).
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er motions, ensure that defendants understand their rights, and make individualized sentencing decisions after careful review of the evidence.101
However, the concept of systemic triage does not simply consider the triage
decisions of individual public defenders, prosecutors, and judges in isolation.
Rather, it highlights the symbiotic nature of triage decision making, attending
to how the resource allocation decisions of an actor in one institution, such as
the prosecutor, inﬂuences the workload of actors in the other institutions, i.e.
public defenders and judges. For instance, a defense lawyer’s decision to take a
case to trial does not simply increase her workload; it also has consequences for
prosecutors and judges. As a result of the defense lawyer’s decision, the prosecutor will have to devote time and resources to tasks such as becoming familiar
with the evidence and responding to motions. Similarly, judges will have to
dedicate time to reviewing pleadings, issuing rulings, and overseeing jury selection, to name a few of the tasks associated with trials.
Systemic triage pays attention to this interdependent relationship amongst
institutional actors. It highlights the fact that while the pressure created by systemic triage comes chieﬂy from the overwhelming number of cases that ﬂood
the system, it also stems from the resource allocation decisions of all actors
within the system. Thus, each individual actor, i.e. each prosecutor, defense
lawyer, and judge, has a vested interest in overseeing how the others exercise
their discretion.
For this reason, attending solely to the triage decisions of one individual institutional actor, such as the prosecutor, is insufficient to understand the systemic effects of triage. Rather, each institutional actor will police the resource
allocation decisions of the others. The policing of decisions across institutions
can create a racialized culture if resource allocation decisions typically favor individuals of one race over another. For instance, courtroom actors will punish
the decision to grant due process rights to an individual who they conclude is
undeserving. As I discuss next, the decision that an individual is undeserving is
more likely to occur when that individual is a person of color, due to implicit
racial bias. Hence, under conditions of systemic triage, a culture of decision
making within a courthouse that sustains racially biased decision making is
predictable.

101.

See infra note 144 and accompanying text for an example of a judge in Cook County engaging in triage behaviors.
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C. Implicit Bias Under Conditions of Systemic Triage
I theorize that racialized justice is the foreseeable consequence of systemic
triage, regardless of the conscious racial motives of judges, prosecutors, and
criminal defense lawyers, and even in the absence of overtly racist practices.
That is because implicit racial biases are likely to impact decision making under
conditions of systemic triage for a number of reasons. First, the proactive policing practices that create the conditions leading to systemic triage also result in
the disproportionate representation of people of color in criminal courtrooms.
Filling criminal courtrooms with overwhelming numbers of people of color
will likely strengthen the already ubiquitous conscious and unconscious association linking people of color with crime and whites with innocence because
simply rehearsing associations strengthens them.102 Strengthening these associations can occur even if many of the cases are dismissed103 and even if judges,
prosecutors, and defense lawyers understand on an intellectual level that this
disproportionate representation is the predictable result of focusing law enforcement efforts on communities of color.
Second, under conditions of systemic triage, prosecutors and defense lawyers are likely anxious and distracted by all of the tasks simultaneously pulling
at their attention, such as listening to the judge, negotiating with opposing
counsel, quickly reviewing case ﬁles, thinking about what they will say when
their cases are called, and answering questions from clients or witnesses. This
multitasking can cause cognitive depletion, which is one of the classic situations in which implicit biases are likely to inﬂuence decisions and judgments.104

102.

These negative associations are not just practiced in the courthouse, but within offices too.
For instance, in Cook County, Van Cleve shares how the Gang Unit of the State’s Attorney’s
Office wallpapers its office with mug shots of black and Latino defendants. VAN CLEVE, supra
note 3, at 1.
103. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 1, at 642-43 (noting that many misdemeanor offenses in New
York City are dismissed).
104. See Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Activation and Application
of Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 509, 509 (1991) (ﬁnding that once
stereotype activation occurred, cognitive “busyness” increased the application of stereotypes); Olesya Govorun & B. Keith Payne, Ego-Depletion and Prejudice: Separating Automatic
and Controlled Components, 24 SOC. COGNITION 111, 111-12 (2006) (discussing cognitive depletion); Graham & Lowery, supra note 79, at 486 (discussing the impact of information
deﬁcits); Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes,
Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 18 (reviewing researchers’ ﬁnding that
“time pressure on a judgment task (thereby reducing attentional resources available for the
task) increased the level of ethnic stereotyping in subjects’ judgments”); Jennifer A. Richeson & J. Nicole Shelton, Negotiating Interracial Interactions: Costs, Consequences, and Possibili-
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Additionally, because courtroom actors handle large numbers of cases, they
will feel compelled to make quick decisions in the face of enormous information deﬁcits about which cases can be disposed of quickly and which cases
are worthy of time and effort. For instance, prosecutors may offer plea bargains
and pressure defense lawyers into convincing their clients to accept them despite the fact that neither actor had the time to thoroughly investigate the case
and interview all the potential witnesses.105 Implicit biases are more likely to
inﬂuence judgments when individuals make discretionary decisions quickly,
based upon incomplete information.106
Implicit racial biases can affect decision making in ways that create and sustain problematic racial disparities. For instance, these biases can cause people to
interpret ambiguous information in racially disparate ways. In one study
demonstrating this, mock jurors were asked to evaluate evidence that was ambiguous as to guilt or innocence.107 The results showed that as a result of implicit racial biases, jurors were signiﬁcantly more likely to conclude that the evidence was probative of guilt when the case involved a dark-skinned
perpetrator versus a light-skinned perpetrator.108 In another study involving an
assault, mock jurors were more likely to conclude that the defendant was less
aggressive and “more honest and moral” when he was white as opposed to
black.109 These differences in judgment were correlated with implicit bias.
Under conditions of systemic triage, it is probable that implicit racial biases
will cause judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers to draw adverse inferences
from ambiguous facts more readily when defendants are black, especially when
nonviolent offenses involving drugs are at issue, since young black men are

105.

106.

107.
108.
109.

ties, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 316, 318 (2007) (discussing dominant group
anxiety during interracial interactions).
Van Cleve’s book provides evidence of this type of behavior. See, e.g., VAN CLEVE, supra note
3, at 122 (discussing her observation that prosecutors rarely read the case ﬁles of “mopes”);
id. at 83-87 (discussing how public defenders are punished for engaging in zealous advocacy).
See Graham & Lowery, supra note 79, at 486 (discussing the impact of information deﬁcits);
Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 104, at 18 (reviewing researchers’ ﬁnding that “time pressure
on a judgment task (thereby reducing attentional resources available for the task) increased
the level of ethnic stereotyping in subjects’ judgments”).
Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit Racial Bias,
and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307, 337 (2010).
Id. at 337-39.
Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice
Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201, 212
(2001). These differences disappeared when race was made salient. Id. at 212-13.
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closely associated with drugs in our conscious and unconscious minds.110
Thus, the conﬂuence of a black defendant and a drug charge will likely make it
cognitively easier to form a judgment that the defendant is guilty and will not
beneﬁt from more process. Conversely, when the defendant is white, implicit
white favoritism will likely make judgments of guilt more difficult, resulting in
the decision that due process will make a difference to the case.
Furthermore, implicit biases can also inﬂuence feelings of empathy. Empathy sensitizes people to injustice111 and plays an important role in discretionary
decision making. In one study, for instance, researchers found that people who
felt more empathy for white defendants than black defendants would give
white defendants more lenient sentences, even when everything else about the
case was identical.112 Moreover, social scientists have found that there is a racial
empathy gap, meaning that empathy for the pain experienced by another does
not occur or occurs with less intensity when white subjects witness or imagine
pain inﬂicted on black individuals.113 This empathy gap is related to levels of

110.

See, e.g., Eberhardt et al., supra note 82, at 883 (discussing the implicit association of blacks
with crime); Trawalter et al., supra note 82, at 1322 (“There is overwhelming evidence that
young Black men are stereotyped as violent, criminal, and dangerous.”); Bernd Wittenbrink
et al., Spontaneous Prejudice in Context: Variability in Automatically Activated Attitudes, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 815 (2001) (discussing how context inﬂuences the activation
of implicit bias). In prior work, Phillip Atiba Goff and I have referred to this quick judgment
of criminality as the “suspicion heuristic.” L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, SelfDefense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293, 295 (2012).
111. See John F. Dovidio et al., Empathy and Intergroup Relations, in PROSOCIAL MOTIVES, EMOTIONS, AND BEHAVIOR: THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE 393, 399 (Mario Mikulincer &
Phillip R. Shaver eds., 2010); Matteo Forgiarini et al., Racism and Empathy for Pain on Our
Skin, 2 FRONTIERS PSYCHOLOGY 1, 1 (2011).
112. James D. Johnson et al., Rodney King and O.J. Revisited: The Impact of Race and Defendant
Empathy Induction on Judicial Decisions, 32 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1208, 1215 (2002). Additionally, the jurors were more likely to attribute the actions of white defendants to the situation. Id. at 1216.
113. Studies have found that witnessing or imagining another individual experiencing pain causes our own brains to react as if we were experiencing pain ourselves. Forgiarini et al., supra
note 111, at 1 (“[E]xperimental data indicate that when people witness or imagine the pain of
another person, they map the other[’s] pain onto their brain using the same network activated during ﬁrsthand experience of pain, as if they were vicariously experiencing the observed pain.” (citations omitted)). However, in one study, the brains of white individuals
exhibited less activation when observing pain inﬂicted on black individuals than on white
individuals. Id. at 2, 4-6. The study did not involve black subjects. To the extent that this racial empathy gap works both ways, that is, that black decision makers would show the same
lack of empathy toward whites experiencing pain, racial disparities would still exist since
blacks are underrepresented in the legal ﬁeld.
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implicit racial bias.114 The more implicit anti-black bias subjects had, the greater was the difference in their empathic responses towards black and white individuals.115
Empathy can cause courtroom actors to take time to ensure that an individual’s due process rights are protected, to respond with more sympathy and listen with more care and attention to a defendant’s concerns, and to pay more
attention to the circumstances of the case. Prosecutors and judges may respond
more favorably to defense counsel’s arguments concerning mitigating circumstances and the hardships their clients might suffer as a result of incarceration.
Empathy may also result in prosecutors being more willing to offer treatment
or other rehabilitative options instead of incarceration, and judges being more
willing to accept these recommendations. Empathy can also inﬂuence defense
lawyers’ decisions about which clients are worthy of zealous advocacy and expending precious capital. However, because the conditions of systemic triage
are likely to trigger implicit biases, courtroom actors might feel less empathy
toward defendants of color. Thus, the beneﬁts of empathy will accrue more to
whites than blacks, resulting in signiﬁcant racial disparities even in the absence
of conscious bias and overtly racist behaviors. In fact, decision makers will be
completely unaware that unconscious biases inﬂuenced their judgments.
The operation of implicit bias under conditions of systemic triage also explains how a courtroom culture can develop that routinely denies due process
to black individuals and others stereotyped as criminal even in the absence of
the type of overt and consciously biased decision making Van Cleve highlights
in her book. Cook County is a paradigmatic case of systemic triage. As Van
Cleve observes, “Cases bombard the system; the average felony prosecutor in
Cook County has three hundred or more open cases at any one time,”116 and in
2005, each public defender resolved approximately 229 felonies, meaning that
they likely worked on many more.117 In one disturbing demonstration of how
this pressure played out in perverse ways, Van Cleve describes an instance
when sheriff ’s deputies “act[ed] as go-betweens to update judges and courtroom workgroups on which court [was] ‘winning.’ One court watcher noted a
judge screaming, “‘Let’s go! Do something!’ at his colleagues when there was a
brief pause in a stream of plea bargains.”118

114.

Id. at 4.
Id.
116. VAN CLEVE, supra note 3, at 72.
117. Id. at 159; see also id. at 28-29, 58 (discussing the extreme time pressure under which defense
attorneys and prosecutors work).
118. Id. at 58.
115.
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Additionally, the association between blacks and crime is well rehearsed in
Cook County given the disproportionate number of people of color charged
with nonviolent offenses.119 Of the almost ten thousand individuals housed in
the Cook County jail, approximately 86.3% are black and Latino men charged
with nonviolent offenses.120 Van Cleve provides evidence of the strong conceptual association between blacks and crime that exists in Cook County.121 For
instance, she describes courtroom actors becoming so accustomed to seeing
black individuals within the courthouse that they become desensitized to the
racial disparities that shocked them when they ﬁrst encountered the system.122
The disproportionate representation of blacks in the criminal courthouse becomes natural and expected. Thus, even if the system in Cook County evolves
to such an extent that judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers no longer engage in race-conscious decision making that apportions due process rights
based on whether or not someone is characterized as a mope,123 and even if
overtly racist practices disappear, it is probable that implicit racial biases will
continue to inﬂuence behaviors in racially problematic ways.
iii. recommended remedies
Consistent with her theme that racism in the Cook County courts is akin to
Jim Crow racism, Van Cleve ends her book by encouraging readers to go to
court to observe the racist practices she describes. Doing so, she argues, is “a
type of activism [that can] lend a conscience to an otherwise unaccountable
system.”124 In Section III.A, I raise questions about the efficacy of her solution,
and in III.B, I offer alternatives.

119.
120.

121.
122.
123.
124.

See id. at 20-21.
Id. at 19 (noting that 67.3% are young black men between the ages of twenty-one and thirty
years, and Latinos and other people of color constitute nineteen percent); id. at 7 (noting
that most of the black and Latino defendants appearing in felony court were charged with
“possession of drugs, theft, intent to sell drugs, or other non-violent offenses”).
See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing instances in which sheriff ’s deputies
treated black researchers like criminals).
See VAN CLEVE, supra note 3, at 27, 32, 101-02.
See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (discussing pricing decisions made by defense
lawyers).
VAN CLEVE, supra note 3, at 189.
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A. Problems with Court Watching
Van Cleve urges readers to help “rectify the . . . racial violence inﬂicted by
the courts”125 by engaging in court watching. The practice of court watching
can be a powerful tool to expose the workings of a court system that operates in
the shadows,126 especially if courtroom actors do not realize that court watchers
are there. Van Cleve’s ethnography is a testament to that. Additionally, if court
watchers are open and obvious, their mere presence might lead judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers to practice the professionalism that should accompany their role.
However, as a long-term solution to the problem of racial bias, court
watching will be ineffective. One reason is that once court watchers leave,
courtroom actors might revert back to their problematic behaviors. Van Cleve
shares an instance of exactly this. When she was clerking at the prosecutor’s
office, a prosecutor cautioned her to be on her “best behavior” after noticing a
court watcher sitting in the gallery.127 Then the judge and prosecutor “began to
‘perform’ the normative professionalism that one would associate with their
roles” until the court watcher left.128 Afterwards, they all burst out laughing.129
Additionally, court watching might even stymie efforts at addressing bias at
the structural level if people expect to witness overtly racist practices similar to
the ones Van Cleve recounts.130 This is likely since she asks readers to
“[r]eplicate my data until you change the ﬁndings in Cook County-Chicago
and perhaps in other jurisdictions.”131 The problem is that court watchers may
not encounter any of these racialized practices since judges, prosecutors, and
defense lawyers may behave differently in their presence, preventing the
watchers from getting an accurate view of the system. Furthermore, many of
Van Cleve’s examples did not occur in open court, but rather during plea negotiations, in conversations with clients, or during interviews of courtroom actors. Such sources of information may not be available to the average court
125.
126.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
See, e.g., Kathleen Daly, Black Women, White Justice, in CROSSING BOUNDARIES: TRADITIONS
AND TRANSFORMATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY RESEARCH 209 (Austin Sarat & Marianne Constable eds., 1998) (sharing stories of courtroom encounters that reveal how black women
experience the justice system).
VAN CLEVE, supra note 3, at 44.
Id.
Id.
She writes that court watching will allow people “to see racial degradation ceremonies performed in the name of criminal justice.” Id. at 189.
Id.
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watcher. If people do not witness these practices, they may conclude that the
system is no longer racially biased and that nothing more needs to be done to
address racism in the criminal courts. However, as I argued in Part II, racial bias exists even when it is not discernible.
The problem of racial bias in the criminal justice system deﬁes easy solutions. The inﬂuence of race on decision making will be difficult to ﬂush out either because people may be unaware of the effect of implicit biases on their
judgments or because they will hide their consciously racist beliefs. Furthermore, the enormous discretion wielded by prosecutors, defense lawyers, and
judges facilitates racial bias, both conscious and implicit. The most effective solution would be to rethink the criminal justice policies and policing practices
that not only create the conditions for systemic triage but also sustain the negative association between people of color and crime. Nevertheless, until that day
arrives, there are some interim solutions that can help to safeguard against the
inﬂuence of implicit racial biases. These are discussed next.
B. Individual, Institutional, and Systemic Solutions
The conditions of systemic triage allow implicit racial biases to thrive. Importantly, however, their effects are not inevitable. In this Section, I discuss
some individual, institutional, and systemic mechanisms that together may
help to reduce the inﬂuence of implicit biases on behaviors and judgments.
At the individual level, two interventions have proven promising: awareness of implicit bias132 and doubting one’s objectivity.133 Both of these interventions work by encouraging people to exercise care when making judgments and
by helping people understand that their judgments might be biased even if
they are not consciously aware of it.134 These tools are especially likely to be
successful when individuals are internally motivated to reduce biased judg132.

Patricia G. Devine & Margo J. Monteith, Automaticity and Control in Stereotyping, in DUALPROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 346 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trop eds., 1999);
Jack Glaser & Eric D. Knowles, Implicit Motivation To Control Prejudice, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 164, 171 (2008); John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Bias Is Beyond
Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies that No Manager Should Ignore, 29 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39, 56-57
(2009); Devin G. Pope et al., Awareness Reduces Racial Bias (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper 19765, 2014) (on ﬁle with author).
133. Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, “I Think It, Therefore It’s True”: Effects of SelfPerceived Objectivity on Hiring Discrimination, 104 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 207, 210-11 (2007).
134. Emily Pronin, Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment, 11 TRENDS COGNITIVE
SCI. 37, 39 (2007).
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ments rather than externally motivated by concerns that others will judge
them.135
These interventions also highlight why the ideology of colorblindness is
problematic. As Eduardo Bonilla-Silva argued in Racism Without Racists, at the
heart of colorblind racism is the “myth” that “race has all but disappeared as a
factor shaping the life chances of all Americans.”136 Furthermore, this ideology
allows “whites [to] enunciate positions that safeguard their racial interests
without sounding ‘racist.’”137 To the extent that courtroom actors engage in
colorblindness, it will stymie efforts to reduce the effects of implicit racial bias
on behaviors and judgments.138 In fact, in social science studies, colorblindness
“has been shown to generate greater individual expressions of racial bias on
both explicit and implicit measures.”139
One practical method for increasing awareness and encouraging people to
doubt their objectivity is through training. Across the country, state and federal
public defenders, prosecutors, and judges are being trained on what implicit
biases are and how they can inﬂuence the decision making of even the most
egalitarian individuals.140 In fact, people who hold perspectives that are genuinely egalitarian can be the perpetrators of biased conduct based on implicit bias, especially if holding these perspectives makes them less likely to question
their objectivity. The Department of Justice recently made these trainings mandatory for prosecutors and law enforcement officers.141
In addition to awareness and questioning objectivity, other individual interventions such as slowing down decision making; engaging in mindful, de-

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

140.
141.

E. Ashby Plant & Patricia G. Devine, Internal and External Motivation To Respond Without
Prejudice, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 811, 824-28 (1998).
EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS 302 (2014).
Id. at 4.
Van Cleve highlights numerous instances of colorblindness amongst courtroom actors. See
supra notes 27-33.
Jennifer K. Elek & Paula Hannaford-Agor, First, Do No Harm: On Addressing the Problem of
Implicit Bias in Juror Decision Making, 49 COURT REV. 190, 193 (2013) (citing Jennifer A.
Richeson & Richard J. Nussbaum, The Impact of Multiculturalism Versus Color-Blindness on
Racial Bias, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 417 (2004)).
I have conducted these trainings for police departments, federal and state prosecutors, and
public defenders.
Office of Pub. Affairs, Department of Justice Announces New Department-Wide Implicit
Bias Training for Personnel, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (June 27, 2016), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr
/department-justice-announces-new-department-wide-implicit-bias-training-personnel
[http://perma.cc/P3K2-JFF4].
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liberate information processing;142 and gathering more information can prevent reliance on implicit stereotypes and attitudes.143 The problem is that the
pressure of systemic triage can make these interventions difficult to accomplish.144 However, engaging in triage is a choice, not a requirement. In fact, triage in the criminal justice context arguably violates constitutional and professional mandates. Thus, prosecutors and defense lawyers should refuse to bow
to the pressure to resolve cases hastily simply to deal with the realities of an
overburdened system.
Professor Jenny Roberts explains that defense lawyers could “refus[e] to
process individuals quickly through the lower criminal courts” by “litigat[ing]
some of the many factual and legal issues” raised by these cases.145 As for prosecutors, they should live up to their special responsibilities as “ministers of justice,”146 which require them, among other things, “to see that the defendant is
accorded procedural justice.”147 Judges, too, should similarly avoid pressuring
defense counsel and prosecutors to rush through jury selection and trials. Some
may object to these proposals because giving defendants the individualized justice and zealous advocacy to which they are entitled will lead to longer delays
and may also raise speedy trial concerns. However, the answer cannot be to
simply continue to short circuit justice in the name of expediency. If giving defendants the process they are due leads the system to grind to a halt, then perhaps this will put pressure on criminal justice system decision makers to re-

142.
143.

144.

145.

146.
147.

Bargh, supra note 78, at 28.
Id. (“[I]t is possible to gain control [over automatic processes] by ‘making the hard choice’
and spending the additional cognitive effort to avoid pigeonholing or stereotyping an individual. Instead, the person can effortfully seek out additional individuating information and
integrate it into a coherent impression.” (citation omitted)); Marilynn B. Brewer, A Dual
Process Model of Impression Formation, in 1 ADVANCES IN SOCIAL COGNITION 1 (Thomas K.
Scrull & Robert S. Wyer, Jr. eds., 1988); Susan T. Fiske & Steven L. Neuberg, A Continuum
of Impression Formation, from Category-Based to Individuating Processes: Inﬂuences of Information and Motivation on Attention and Interpretation, in 23 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1990).
Sometimes there is good reason to attempt to resolve cases quickly. For instance, sometimes
a defendant can get released from custody immediately or have his case dismissed instead of
languishing in jail.
Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1131 (2013);
Michelle Alexander, Opinion, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice
-system.html [http://perma.cc/A87K-7SWR].
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
Id.
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think the policing practices and criminal justice policies that create the conditions of systemic triage in the ﬁrst place.
None of these interventions will be easy to accomplish. However, once
people are aware that there are steps they can take to address implicit biases,
the failure to do so is as culpable as acting on the basis of conscious racial bigotry.148 Judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers should accept responsibility
for taking steps to reduce the inﬂuence of implicit biases; otherwise they are
complicit in continuing to sustain a racialized system. There is reason for optimism that some courtroom actors will engage in these efforts. For instance,
Federal District Court Judge Mark M. Bennett attempts to reduce the effects of
implicit racial biases on his sentencing judgments by stripping photos and all
racial indicators from his presentence reports.149
While individual interventions are important, they must be accompanied
by interventions at the institutional level in order to increase the chances of
success. If this does not occur, it might be difficult for one individual to withstand the pressure to conform by speeding up case adjudications. For instance,
Van Cleve relates how prosecutors and judges punished defense lawyers who
attempted to engage in zealous advocacy.150 This is unsurprising given the
symbiotic nature of systemic triage, where the resource allocation decisions of
one actor inﬂuence the workload of the others. Thus, even if an individual public defender decides to slow down in order to safeguard against the inﬂuence of
implicit biases on decision making, the pressure and formal and informal punishments that the individual will suffer from judges and prosecutors because of
his or her efforts may result in that individual succumbing to the pressure.
The leaders of prosecutor and public defender offices can assist by making
it clear that they will support the efforts of their line personnel to do what is
necessary to ensure that they are living up to their ethical and constitutional
obligations. This will help reduce the inﬂuence of implicit bias not only because it will give individuals the courage to resist the pressure to dispose of cases quickly, but also because people are motivated to conform their beliefs to
those of the people around them.151 Thus, institutions should clearly com148.

One important caveat needs to be made here. My argument is not that moving swiftly
through a case is always problematic. For instance, there are circumstances when defense
counsel may want to quickly resolve a case because doing so will result in a better outcome
for her client. Rather, I am simply making the point that rushing through cases solely to deal
with the pressures of triage is problematic.
149. This knowledge is based on conversations with Judge Bennett.
150. See supra notes 54-58.
151. Gretchen B. Sechrist & Charles Stangor, Perceived Consensus Inﬂuences Intergroup Behavior
and Stereotype Accessibility, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 645, 651 (2001).
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municate that making efforts to reduce the inﬂuence of implicit biases is important and provide institutional backing for those efforts. This will make individuals more likely to accept the punishment they might face from other institutional actors for refusing to engage in triage decision making and help
them ﬁght the pressure to practice racialized justice. Institutional support can
also facilitate the creation of a cohort of like-minded individuals, making it easier to maintain one’s commitment to do what is necessary to address implicit
biases.
Some institutions are already engaged in these efforts. For instance, San
Francisco Public Defender Jeff Adachi has established safeguards in his office to
reduce implicit biases’ pernicious effects. These safeguards include asking his
attorneys to use checklists that require them to answer questions such as, “how
would I handle this case different[ly] if my client was another race or had a
different social background.”152 Additionally, one district attorney’s office in
North Carolina has asked an implicit bias expert to embed herself in the office
to help line prosecutors determine how to reduce the inﬂuence of implicit biases on their discretionary decisions.153 Both of these examples send the message
throughout the office that the institution believes these efforts are important,
thereby helping to motivate individuals to conform their behaviors to meet this
expectation.
Finally, even if individuals and institutions make efforts to reduce the inﬂuence of implicit racial biases, the gold standard would be coordinated change
among different arms of the criminal justice system—that is, the prosecutor’s
office, the public defender’s office, and judges working together to address
these biases. As I discussed in Part II, systemic triage attends to the interaction
between criminal justice system institutions and the ways in which the resource
allocation decisions of one inﬂuence the other. Thus, even if one institution encourages its personnel to engage in efforts to reduce implicit bias, the others
might resist the increase in their workload that this might cause.
All three institutions should instead work together to ensure that the goal
of efficiency does not override the important values of fairness, equality, and
protection of constitutional rights. They should encourage each other to practice normative professionalism and pressure each other to align their practices
with their beliefs in due process, legal ethics, and other values that likely motivated them to practice criminal law in the ﬁrst place. If this occurred, it would
152.

Jeff Adachi, Public Defenders Can Be Biased, Too, and It Hurts Their Non-White Clients, WASH.
POST (June 7, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/06/07
/public-defenders-can-be-biased-too-and-it-hurts-their-non-white-clients [http://perma.cc
/S98M-9CRG].
153. This information is based on my conversations with this implicit bias expert.
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slow down the system to such an extent that policymakers would be forced to
confront the problem of overburdened courts and insufficient resources. This
might provoke changes to current criminal justice policies and policing practices that not only create the conditions for systemic triage, but, by ﬁlling criminal
courtrooms with individuals of color charged with nonviolent offenses, also
help to strengthen the association linking black and brown individuals with
crime and whites with innocence.
While it might sound unrealistic to think that institutions could work together to reduce implicit racial bias, aspects of this are already occurring in Seattle, Washington. A group consisting of two federal district court judges, the
U.S. Attorney and an Assistant U.S. Attorney, the Federal Public Defender, an
ACLU director and an ACLU staff attorney, two civil lawyers, and a law professor are working together to develop jury instructions and a jury orientation
video to help address the probable effects of implicit biases on jury decision
making.154 The commitment of this diverse group to address the effects of implicit racial bias provides reason for optimism that other courthouses across the
country might engage in similar efforts. While the Seattle project is currently
limited to jury decision making, it is possible that the awareness of implicit bias
underlying this undertaking and the trust and relationships that have developed during the process will translate into a joint effort to reduce triage decision making in the courthouse.
conclusion
As this Review argues, racialized practices need not be overt, punitive, and
extreme, and courtroom actors need not be consciously biased in order for race
to have pernicious and disturbing consequences on behaviors and judgments.
However, to the extent that people today are more likely to be consciously egalitarian than not, there is reason to hope that educating criminal justice actors
about implicit racial biases and how systemic triage makes it more challenging
to safeguard against the inﬂuence of these biases might help encourage actors
to ﬁght for institutional and structural changes. Changing the institutional and
structural conditions that allow implicit biases to ﬂourish is important because
this “new” racism is, as Van Cleve concludes about colorblind racism, “just as
punitive and abusive”155 as old-fashioned bigotry. In fact, this new racism is in
some ways more dangerous and pernicious than racial bigotry because it is
ephemeral and difficult to eradicate.

154.

This is a project with which I am involved.
155. VAN CLEVE, supra note 3, at 186.
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Van Cleve’s important ethnography brings to light the hidden and pernicious workings of the criminal justice system that often operates in the shadows. Based on the model of systemic triage introduced in this Review, it is likely that the racialized practices she exposes also exist in many other jurisdictions
with overburdened courts, although these practices may not operate in a similarly overt and explicit fashion. Even more troubling is the probability that
these practices will thrive under conditions of systemic triage despite the existence of constitutional protections, a court record, and prosecutors, defense
lawyers, and judges who are ostensibly committed to lofty principles of justice
and fairness. The problematic practices of racism without racists make a mockery of justice that should trouble us all.
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